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ABSTRACT 
Immigrants enter self-employment more often than native 
workers; comparisons of immigrant and native earnings must 
somehow incorporate the self-employed. A two-sector model is 
used to test several theories of immigrant self-employment; the 
model provides no evidence of selection into either sector, but 
rejects the equality of wage and self-employment earnings 
functions. Incorporating these results, estimates of immigrant 
earnings growth are calculated. They suggest that self-employed 
immigrant assimilation rates are higher than wage-employed rates. 
When an immigrant groups contains lots of self-employed workers, 
exclud~ng them will bias downwards estimates of immigrant 
assimilation. 
1 Introduction 
Research into the earnings of recent immigrants to the United 
States (Chiswick[1978] and [1986], Borjas[1985] and [1987], and 
Jasso and Rosenzweig[1986] and [1987]) overlooks an important 
phenomenon among the immigrant population. Immigrants have higher 
self-employment rates than ·the native,..-born; moreover, immigrant 
self-employment rates grew more quickly over the decade of the 
seventies. In order to better understand how immigrants fare in 
the U.S. market, one must better understand why they choose self­
employment more often than the native-born. 
The self-employed present a difficult problem for any 
investigation into wages or earnings. Because of greater 
underreporting (U.S. Internal Revenue Service [ 1979 J) , self-
employment earnings are less reliable than reported wage and 
salary earnings; moreover, one hesitates to assume that the 
observed average wage in self-employment represents the marginal 
product of labor in self-employment. Thus, many analyses of 
immigrant wages exclude self-employed workers. This exclusion may 
have substantial effects on cross-section, panel, or cohort 
studies of immigrant earnings. 
The goals of this study are twofold. First, it will 
establish that the self-employment experience of immigrants 
differs from that of the native-born, and that previous exclusions 
of the self-employed from studies of immigrant earnings may lead 
to misleading conclusions about the relative rate of immigrant 
earnings growth. Second, this study investigates the determinants 
of self-employment in the framework of a 2-sector switching 
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regressions model. I will examine the self-employment patterns of 
six immigrant ethnic groups Whites (non-Hispanics), Blacks, 
Asians, Cubans, Mexicans, and other Hispanics. 
The chapter is divided as follows : section two examines the 
self-employment rates for immigrant and native-born workers, and 
demonstrates the effect of excluding the self-employed in a brief 
example. Section three discusses several theories of self­
employment, and briefly surveys previous studies of self­
employment. Section four outlines a switching regressions model 
of earnings. Section five discusses data and variables. Section 
six presents and discusses the results of estimation, and section 
seven incorporates into a measure of immigrant assimilation the 
results of section six. Section eight concludes the chapter. 
2 The Importance of Immigrant Self-employment 
2.1 Comparing Self-employment Rates 
Table 1 presents estimates of self-employment rates for 
immigrant and native-born ethnic groups in 1970. Table 2 presents 
self-employment rates for the same groups in 1980. Each immigrant 
group is divided into three cohorts, based on year of immigration 
: 1950-59, 1960-64, and 1965-69. In addition, the sample contains 
only those who were 18-54 years old in 1970, and 28-64 years old 
in 1980. 1 
1 These results are for all males, regardless of labor force 
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Several clear patterns emerge from table 1. Notice first the 
White rates in 1970 : immigrant cohorts that arrived in the U.S. 
earlier have higher self-employment rates, either because they 
have been in the country longer (and thus had time to accumulate 
capital and learn about the U.S. market), or because of some other 
unobserved trait that varies across cohorts. Native Whites have a 
higher rate of self-employment than immigrant cohort 1965-69, but 
only one-half the self-employment rates of the 1960-64 and 1950-59 
cohorts. Table 2 shows that, in 1980, self-employment rates are 
significantly higher than in 1970 for every White cohort. Note, 
however, that immigrant self-employment rates are at least 7 
percentage points higher than the native rate - the rate for 
cohort 1965-69 quadruples, the rate for cohort 1960-64 doubles, 
and the rate for cohort 1950-59 grows by 50%. In short, White 
immigrant self-employment rates are higher than White native 
rates, and grew faster over the decade of the seventies. 2 
The five other ethnic groups in Tables 1 and 2 differ only 
slightly from the White pattern. In 1970, self-employment rates 
for the native-born are smaller than the rates for earlier 
immigrants, and larger than the rate for immigrants who arrived 
status. They are only slightly different if the sample is 
restricted to full-time workers. 
2 A breakdown of self-employment rates by age indicates that 
the growth in self-employment is a result of a surge of self­
employment among the younger age groups. Self-employment rates 
change little for older age groups. This result appears to 
contradict the finding of Fuchs[1982] that older workers move into 
self-employment in order to reduce their hours or to continue to 
work at a lower wage. Fuchs's study observed an older cohort of 
males from 1969 to 1973, however. 
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during 1965-69. In 1980, immigrant self-employment rates double 
or triple, while native-born rates of self-employment grow little 
or not at all. Later immigrant groups ( those who arrived in 
1965-69) have the largest rates of growth in self-employment. 
Mexican and Black immigrants have the lowest rates of self-
employment, and self-employment growth The highest rate of 
self-employment among these two groups is 8.05%. Neither the 
native-born of Mexican descent nor native-born Blacks experienced 
much growth in self-employment from 1970 to 1980, however. Asian, 
Cuban, and Other Hispanic immigrants have large jumps in self­
employment during the seventies, similar to the White pattern. 3 
One must be careful about how much weight to place on a 
comparison of the 1970 and 1980 self-employment estimates. Recent 
research suggests that return migration and the increased 
coverage of illegal aliens in the 1980 Census affect the 
composition of observed immigrant cohorts over time. 4 These 
composition changes may partially explain the increases in self-
employment. Say, for example, that the self-employed are less 
likely to remigrate (because of a non-transferable investment in 
3 one explanation for high immigrant self-employment rates is 
that immigrants happen to enter industries and occupations that 
have high self-employment rates. Instead of explaining self­
employment rates, according to this argument, one should seek to 
explain the choice of industry or occupation. A breakdown of 
immigrant and native workers into broad industry-occupation 
classifications, however, reveals that 60-90% of the immigrant­
native self-employment differential is due to higher immigrant
self-employment rates in the same types of jobs. 
4 Jasso and Rosenzweig[l982) estimate emigration rates 
for several immigrant groups of anywhere between 20 and 50 
percent during the 70 1 s. Passel and Woodrow[l984) estimate that 
2 million illegal aliens were counted in the 1980 Census. 
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U.S. capital, perhaps). Cohorts which experience large 
remigrations will appear to have rising self-employment rates. 
2.2 The Impact of the Self-employed on Assimilation Rate 
Estimates 
Tables 1 and 2, subject to the caution suggested by 
remigration and illegal immigration, suggest that self-employment 
rates are higher for immigrants than for the native-born, and that 
this difference in self-employment rates increased over the 
seventies. These patterns have implications for earnings studies 
that exclude the self-employed from their samples. If self-
employment constitutes an improvement in one's economic condition, 
the exclusion of the self-employed from a comparison of cohort 
earnings in 1970 and 1980 will understate immigrant relative 
earnings growth. Conversely, if immigrants are negatively 
selected into self-employment, immigrant earnings growth will be 
understated. 
Borjas[l985] excludes the self-employed from his working 
samples. He runs wage regressions on 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census 
data, and constructs estimates of immigrant assimilation rates 
(relative wage growth) by comparing predicted relative wages for 
the same immigrant cohort in 1970 and 1980, controlling for 
education, experience, and several other variables. Because he 
finds weak or insignificant rates of immigrant assimilation, 
contradicting previous studies, it is fruitful to check the 
sensitivity of his results to the exclusion of the self-employed. 
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Table 3 presents two sets of assimilation rate estimates 
using Borjas 1 s procedure; the first set of estimates excludes the 
self-employed, the second set includes them. 5 In line with 
Borjas 1 s methodology, the native control group is the native-born 
ethnic counterpart for each group except the Cuban (there are few 
native-born Americans of Cuban descent). Both sets of 
assimilation rate estimates for the White sample are significantly 
positive, but they are larger when the self-employed are included. 
The estimates increase by about 20% for the 1965-69 and 1960-64 
cohorts, and by 40% for the 1950-59 cohort. Estimated relative 
wage growth is 2-3 percentage points higher for white immigrant 
cohorts when the self-employed are added to the sample. The 
estimates are more striking for the Asians. Although the estimate 
for the 1950-59 cohort decreases slightly when the self-employed 
are added, the other cohort estimates increase by 4-6 percentage 
points. The 1965-69 and 1960-64 estimates increase by 25%, and 
the 1960-64 estimate becomes significantly positive. 6 
5 There are several differences between Borjas 1 s original 
procedure and this replication, the most noticeable difference 
being that, whereas Borjas ran log wage regressions, the 
replication uses log earnings regressions. The results are not 
sensitive to this choice of dependent variable. This replication 
excludes non-full time workers, immigrants who arrived in the U.S. 
prior to 1950, and workers whose full-time wage was lower than 
one-half the minimum wage or greater than $100 per hour. (See 
section five for a fuller discussion of these selection rules.) 
6 Assimilation rate estimates, calculated for four other 
immigrant groups, (Blacks, Mexicans, Cubans, and Other Hispanics), 
were only slightly larger or smaller when the self-employed were 
added to the sample. Since self-employment rates are relatively 
small for all of these groups (except the Cubans), their effect on 
the full sample 1 s earnings is limited. 
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The estimates from Table 3 suggest that the self-employed 
component of any immigrant cohort cannot be deleted without 
consequence. How they are to be included in the analysis of 
earnings is not clear, however. In order to include them in the 
assimilation rate estimates, one must explore the determinants of 
sector choice (self- versus wage employment) and the determinants 
of earnings in the two sectors. For example, if there exists 
significant selection into either sector, the Ordinary Least 
Squares coefficient estimates may be biased; In the case of 
significant selection, the assimilation rate estimates must make 
use of the selection terms and consistent, selectivity-corrected 
coefficient estimates. If the earnings functions for wage- and 
self-employment earnings are significantly different, the 
coefficient estimates from a single, pooled regression will be 
inconsistent. If the two types of workers cannot be 'lumped 
together 1 as in column two of table the proper estimate of3' 
cohort earnings becomes some weighted average of earnings in both 
sectors. The following four sections attempt to gain some insight 
into the determinants of sectoral choice and earnings. 
Previous Studies, and Candidate Theories, of Self-employment 
Recent empirical work has explored several aspects of the 
self-employment decision. Rees and Shah[l986], Blau[1985], and 
Vijverberg[ 1985] investigate the effects of human capital and 
demographic variables; Long[1982] and Blau[l987] point to the 
effect of the income tax burden; Fuchs[1982] looks at the effect 
of old age; Borjas[1986) investigates the effect of immigrant 
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enclaves. 
Several hypotheses, formulated in terms of human capital 
theory, seek to explain the self-employment decision in general, 
and the immigrant self-employment decision in particular. They 
are 
1) differential taxation of wage and self-employment 
earnings, 
2) immigrant enclaves, 
3) origin country labor market characteristics (affecting 
pre-immigration labor market experience), and 
All three hypotheses are tested in this analysis. 7 
Several researchers have pointed out the effect of the income 
tax system on the self-employment decision. Long[l 982] stresses 
two of the tax benefits of being self-.. employed in the U.S. J:i'irst, 
the self-employed may easily evade tax reporting by taking 
payments in cash. This option is unavailable to salaried workers 
because of federal withholding provisions. The Internal Revenue 
Service[l979] estimates that, in 1976, the self-employed reported 
7 A fourth possible explanation for immigrant self-employment 
is discrimination in the labor market. For whatever reason 
(employers either have 1 tastes' for discrimination or imperfectly 
interpret immigrant education and experience signals), an 
immigrant with high ability will not realize his potential 
earnings in the discriminatory wage sector, and will have to 
employ himself to realize his full earnings potential. In the 
presence of labor market discrimination, one expects to find a 
larger immigrant-to-native earnings ratio in self-employment than 
in wage-employment. Unfortunately, other types of discrimination, 
notably in the product market, imply lower immigrant earnings in 
self-employment. A comparison of immigrant earnings in self­
employment and wage-employment cannot distinguish between these 
two types of discrimination. The switching regressions model 
employed in this paper is thus ill-suited to answer questions 
about discrimination against immigrants. 
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only 60-64% of their earnings, compared to a 97-98% rate for wage 
and salary workers. 8 In addition to the incentive for tax 
evasion, the self-employed may take advantage of the generous tax 
treatment of business expenses. They can more easily claim the 
costs of travel, housing, entertaining, etc., as business 
deductions. As a result of tax evasion and business deductions, 
self-employment income is taxed at a lower effective rate than 
wage and salary income. Therefore, where income tax rates are 
high, one will see high self-employment rates, according to this 
hypothesis. Long estimates a linear probability model of self­
employment. He finds a significantly positive coefficient on the 
total tax liability on potential wage and salary earnings. 
Blau[1987], using U.S. aggregate time series data, finds a 
positive coefficient for the marginal tax rate on $17,000, and a 
negative coefficient for the marginal tax rate on $7,000. 
George Borjas [1986] suggests that immigrant self-employment 
is partly explained by what he terms an enclave effect. He 
explains the enclave effect as follows : 
The sociological literature ... has presented extensive 
anecdotal evidence of how immigrants create enclaves by 
concentrating in specific geographical areas, and of how 
these enclaves create and spread opportunities for 
immigrants to become self-employed ... immigrants from a 
particular national group are assumed to have a 
comparative advantage in serving the needs of consumers 
from that national group (p.502). 
This comparative advantage is supposedly generated by the better 
information immigrants have about their own national group 1 s 
8 The Internal Revenue Service calculates these figures by a 
residual method. Essentially, they compare income reported on 
income tax forms with corresponding aggregate income figures. 
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consumer preferences. It is not clear, however, why this 
advantage leads to self-employment, instead of to immigrant-
managed firms owned by natives. An appeal to comparative 
informational advantage alone does not explain why it is more 
profitable for immigrants to take advantage of their private 
information in self-employment rather than in wage employment. 
Perhaps immigrant enclaves provide easier access to start-up 
capital, or immigrants in enclaves have tastes for services 
provided by immigrant-owned businesses. In a logit model of self­
employment, Borjas estimates a significantly positive effect for 
enclaves, defined as the proportion of the local population 
belonging to an immigrant's country-of-origin group. 
Previous research concentrated on tax and cohort effects; two 
other possible explanations for self-employment warrant further 
examination. One hypothesis is that immigrants bring sector-
specific capital with them when they immigrate; they have 
experience in the self-employed sector of their country of origin, 
and so are better able to prosper in the self-employed sector of 
the U.S. economy. Immigrants from nations whose self-employment 
rates are relatively high are more likely to possess managerial 
and business skills that give them a comparative advantage in 
self-employment. Conversely, immigrants from nations whose wage 
and salary sectors are relatively large are more likely to have a 
comparative advantage in the wage and salary labor market. To my 
knowledge, this hypothesis has not yet been tested. Data on the 
size of the non-agricultural self-employment and own-account 
sectors of a wide range of countries are, however, available. 
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These three hypotheses of self-employment (taxes, enclaves, 
country of origin characteristics), can be tested in a switching 
regression framework. The next section outlines the model. 
4 Model Specification 
Rees and Shah[l986) and Blau[l985) both estimate wage-versus­
self-employment sector switching regression models on British and 
Malaysian cross-sections, respectively. Vijverberg[1985] expands 
the endogenous switching specification to account for those who 
are both wage- and self-employed, estimating an index function 
equal to the proportion of work devoted to wage employment. 
Another recent use of switching regression methodology is Van der 
Gaag and Vijverberg[1988], who estimate a switching regression 
model of public and private sector earnings in Cote d'Ivoire, 
using full information maximum likelihood methods. 
The model is set up as follows. Individual i's earnings in 
self- and wage employment are given by equations 1 and 2 : 
(1) ln y 1 (i) = X(i)S 1 + e 1 (i) 
(2) ln y 2 (i) = X(i)S2 + e 2 (i) 
y 1 and y2 are earnings in wage and self-employment, respectively. 
Xis a vector of human capital and demographic variables thought 
to affect earnings in both sectors. 9 and are error terms,e 1 e 2 
9The X vector in the equation for y2 should include a capital 
variable. Unfortunately, I have no capital or assets variable. 
Following the literature, I proxy for capital with age. thusS2 
includes both the effects of capital and the effect of experience. 
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possibly correlated, with zero means, variances and , ando 1 o2 
covariance 0 12 • S1 and S2 are parameters. 
As was discussed in section 3, reported self-employment 
income is likely to be less than actual self-employment earnings. 
If the variables in X(i) are correlated with the percentage of 
self-employment income unreported, the estimates of will beS1 
biased. For example, if workers with greater experience are more 
adept at hiding their income, then the estimates of the return to 
experience in self-employment will be biased downwards those 
with more _experience will have higher incomes, but will hide a 
greater percentage of it. If increased education similarly leads 
to increased underreporting, the estimated coefficient on 
education will be biased downwards. 
Previous estimates of self-employment earnings assume that 
earnings (or wages) in both sectors are distributed lognormally. 
Following the lead of Heckman and Sedlacek[1985], my model nests 
the lognormal distribution by using the transformation of Box and 
Cox[l964]. 10 In place of ln y 1 and ln y 2 in equations 1 and 2, 
substitute the following expressions 
\ 1 and \ 2 are Box-Cox parameters, to be estimated jointly with the 
other parameters of the model. This framework neatly nests 
1 °For a discussion of the usefulness of the Box-Cox 
transformation in limited-dependent variable models, see 
Poirier[l978]. 
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lognormality: when =A 2 =O, income is distributed lognormally.A1 
Conventional test statistics can be used to test the assumption. 
In addition, when A1 =A 2 =l, income enters untransformed. 
The Box-Cox transformation place certain restrictions on the 
range of the error terms and To insure that income ise 1 e2 
positive, the errors must fulfill the following conditions : 
1 + A1 (X(i)~ 1 + e 1 (i)) > 0 
1 + A2 (X(i)~2 + e 2 (i)) > 0. 
In effect, the imposition of this condition amounts to an 
assumption that the error terms are random draws from a truncated 
normal distribution. 
In deriving the form of the index function, or self­
employment choice equation, it is assumed that individuals 
maximize utility. Utility V(i) in each sector is modelled as a 
linear function of a vector of personal and regional 
characteristics Z(i), transformed income in that sector, and a 
normal error term u (i subscripts are suppressed) : 
(3) v 1 = Zo 1 + Y1 (A 1 )µ 1 - u 1 
(4) V2 = Zo2 + Y2 (A2 )µ 2 - u 2 
Taking the difference of equations 3 and 4, and substituting for 
Y1 and Y2 from equations 1 and 2, yields the reduced form index 
function 
I(i)=l if I+(i) > o 
I(i)=O if I+(i) < o 
14 
Equations 1, 2, 5, and the distributional assumptions on the 
error terms (Box-Cox for the earnings equations, normal for the 
index function), constitute the empirical model, to be estimated 
by full information maximum likelihood. The model is identified 
by the distributional assumptions. Many researchers, however, are 
uncomfortable with the reliance upon distributional assumptions 
for identification; in the next section, several overidentifying 
exclusion restrictions are suggested which may be more acceptable. 
5 Data and Variables 
Earnings and personal variables are drawn from the A and B 
samples of the 1980 Census Public Use Samples. The 1970 and 1980 
Censuses are the only U.S. data sources that identify the year of 
immigration as well as the country of birth. One drawback of this 
data is that it does not break down hours into hours of self- and 
wage employment, and it does not adequately distinguish self-
employment earnings from wage earnings. For example, 22% of 
native-born workers in my sample classify themselves as self­
employed, but report earnings in both self- and wage employment; 
often they are employees of their own incorporated firm. A 
smaller proportion (2%) of the those who classify themselves as 
wage employed report earnings in both sectors. As a result, it is 
not clear that reported wage earnings are generated solely by wage 
employment. I cannot calculate wages for the two activities 
separately, or identify those who are both wage and self-employed. 
Therefore, any coding errors in the self-employment variable 
cannot be adequately checked against reported income in the two 
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sectors. 
The variables drawn from the Census are as follows SELF 
equals 1 for persons who work in their own business, profession, 
or trade; otherwise, SELF equals O. LEARN equals log earnings 
from self- and wage employment. Variables for age and age 
squared, education, and a dummy for southern residence are also 
included. LANG is a dummy set equal to one of individual either 
speaks English badly or not at all. FOR is a dummy set equal to 1 
for the foreign born. D70-74,D65-69,D60-64,D50-59 are dummies 
equal to 1 for immigrants who entered the U.S. during years 
1970-74, 1965-69, 1960-64, and 1950-59, respectively. 
The age and education variables should be included in both the 
earnings equations and the index function. To the extent that 
earnings and the probability of entering self-employment are 
different for immigrants, the dummy variables for year of 
immigration should appear in both earnings equations and the index 
function. 
Enclave variables are drawn from the 1980 Census State 
Reports data on immigrant population by country of birth for the 
150 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) 
%COUNTRY percentage of SMSA population from same country of 
birth. Equals O for the native-born. 11 
A variable for country of origin self-employment is 
calculated from the International Labor Organization Yearbook of 
11Variables for the absolute number of people in the SMSA 
from the same country of birth, and the SMSA total population were 
also constructed. Both were statistically insignificant in the 
earnings and index functions. 
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Labor Statistics, 1950 to 1975. The home country self-employment 
rate is defined as the percentage of males in the non-agricultural 
sector who were self-employed or own-account workers for each 
available year. Each cohort from the same country of origin was 
assigned the self-employment rate for that country in 1969. When 
the 1969 self-employment rate is missing, it is interpolated from 
surrounding years. In order to compare them to the U.S. rate, 
Each origin-country self-employment rate is divided by the U.S. 
rate. 
HOMESELF country of origin 1969 self-employment rate, 
relative to the U.S. rate. Equals 1 for the 
native-born. 
Jasso and Rosenzweig[1986] and Borjas[1987] both investigate 
the relationships between an array of country of origin 
characteristics and immigrant earnings. In addition to HOMESELF, 
two variables which they find important are included in this 
analysis. GNP78 is home country aggregate income per capita in 
1978; it reflects the opportunity cost of immigrating to the U.S., 
and should be positively correlated with immigrant earnings. The 
other variable, MILES, is the distance from the home country to 
the nearest U.S. port of entry. MILES also reflects the cost of 
immigration, and should therefore be positively correlated with 
immigrant earnings. 
Variation in the tax rates individuals face is approximated 
by federal and state income tax schedules and deductions obtained 
from the Commerce Clearing House State Tax Guide. I also 
collected data on the deductibility of federal taxes by state. 
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With this information, I calculated the total federal and state 
average tax rate on $25,000. 1 2 
AVGTAX$25 average federal and state income 
tax rate on $25,000 
Both the earnings equations and the index function may 
arguably include %COUNTRY, because the size of the immigrant 
community may affect self-employment through easier access to 
capital, apart from its affect on earnings. According to the 
enclave hypothesis, %COUNTRY will have a positive sign in the 
index function. If the enclave effect works primarily through its 
effect on earnings in the two sectors, it will have a larger 
coefficient in the self-employment earings equation than in the 
wage-employment equation. If the country of origin labor market 
hypothesis is true, I expect HOMESELF to positively effect self­
employment earnings, and to negatively affect wage earnings. 
Immigrants from countries with large self-employed sectors will 
have a relative advantage in self-employment. 
If the tax rate hypothesis is true, the tax variable will 
have a positive coefficient in the index function. There are 
several reasons why it may also appear in the earnings functions. 
First, income-underreporting may be more prevalent in high-tax 
states, in which case it will have a negative coefficient in the 
earnings equations. On the other hand, workers who are mobile 
across state boundaries may require high earnings in order to work 
12Marginal tax rates $25,000 were also calculated, but were 
statistically insignificant whenever they were tried. Tax 
variables which incorporate city tax rates were substituted for 
the above tax variables, and did not affect the results. 
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in a high-tax state, in which case taxes will be positively 
correlated with earnings in the two sectors. 
Although the parameters of the model are identified by 
distributional assumptions, several overidentifying restrictions 
can be tested. According to the self-employment hypotheses, the 
tax and home country self-employment variables can be excluded 
from the sector earnings equations. With regard to taxes, this 
amounts to the assumption that the tax rate affects the choice of 
self-employment only through the after-tax value of earnings in 
the two sectors, and does not affect observed before-tax earnings 
in the two sectors. The exclusion of HOMESELF from the earnings 
equations amounts to the assumption that the advantage that self­
employment experience confers operates only through decreased 
start-up costs or increaoed non-pecuniary satisfaction. These 
overidentifying assumptions will all be tested. 
The data consist of males, ages 25-64, from the A and B 
samples of the 1980 Census Public Use Samples. I divide the data 
into six ethnic groups : White, Black, Mexican, Asian, Cuban, and 
Other Hispanic. The native-born comparison group is drawn 
randomly from all ethnic groups except Black Americans. The 
immigrants are a 6% sample of the total immigrant population; the 
native-born are a .20% sample. Table 4 chronicles the reasons for 
and results of the sample selection rules. Because I will be 
working with earnings, not wages, I delete all those with zero 
earnings, all part-time workers (hours<35), and all workers who 
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worked less than 30 weeks in 1979. 13 Next I deleted those who 
reside outside the 150 largest SMSA I s. Also deleted were those 
immigrants from countries for which I had no enclave data. In 
order to concentrate on non-agricultural self-employment rates, 
the sample is restricted to workers in non-agricultural 
industries. 14 Enclave data exist for immigrant populations from 
53 countries of origin; Of the 53 countries for which I have 
enclave data, six report no self-employment rates in the ILO 
yearbooks, 15 and can thus produce no HOMESELF variable. In an 
effort to exclude outliers from the sample, only workers whose 
wages are greater than one half the minimum wage in 1979 and less 
than $100 are included. 16 Finally, computing capacity limits the 
size of the data set to a subsample. A sub-sample of the data 
(weighted to leave approximately 1000 of each immigrant group and 
4000 natives) leaves 6099 immigrants and 4142 native-born 
controls. 
13Some of those observations deleted for nonpositive earnings 
report negative earnings; however, they constitute a small 
fraction (1-2%) of those deleted for this reason. 
14The determination of self- or wage-employment status is 
likely to be different in the agricultural sector, where capital 
requirements are relatively large, and self-employment rates are 
high for the native-born. 
15The six countries are the Azores, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Lebanon, Vietnam, and Barbados. 
16Mellor[1987] estimates that only . 725% of males over 25 
years of age who work full time earn less than the m1.n1.mum wage. 
Presumably, an even smaller percentage earn less than 1/2 the 
minimum wage. Thus, one would expect somewhat less than .725% of 
the sample to be excluded as outliers when they were actually low­
wage earners. This rule excludes 2.94% of the immigrants in the 
sample, and 2.04% of the native-born. Few of these exclusions are 
likely to be actual low-wage earners. 
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Table 5 displays descriptive statistics for the samples used 
in the analysis. Three of the six ethnic groups (White, Asian, 
Cuban, and Other Hispanic) have significantly higher self­
employment rates than the native-born; Black, Mexican, and Other 
Hispanic rates are lower. While White immigrants have higher 
earnings than the native-born, the other groups have lower or 
equal earnings (Mexicans earn on average 31% less, Blacks 25%, and 
Other Hispanics 19% less than native workers). The Whites and 
Cubans have less education and more experience than the native 
sample; the Asians have more education and less experience, and 
the Blacks, Mexicans, and Other Hispanics are younger and less 
educated. Only the Cuban sample is more heavily concentrated in 
the South (61.6%) than native workers; Asians (10.1%) and Whites 
(13 .1%) are least concentrated there. Less than ten percent of 
White and Black groups have difficulty with English; Almost one­
half (47 .6%) of Mexican immigrants have difficulty with English;, 
33.9% of Cuban immigrants do. Home country self employment rates 
are on average larger than the native rate for every immigrant 
group; the mean ratios range from 1. 27 for the White sample to 
2. 42 for the Mexican sample. The other Hispanic sample live in 
the smallest enclaves (.28%), while the Cubans live in the largest 
(the average enclave size is 10.8%, reflecting the concentration 
of Cubans in Miami). Finally, every group except the Cubans faces 
on average significantly higher rates of average taxation than do 
natives. High immigrant self-employment rates appear to be 
associated with less education, high rates of origin-country self 
employment, and higher average tax rates than the native-born. 
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6 Switching Regression Estimates 
6.1 Preliminaries 
Table 6 presents the estimated switching regressions model, 
estimated on a pooled immigrant and native-born sample, using full 
information maximum likelihood methods. Several of the variables 
need explaining. 
First, the model allows the intercepts, the age-earnings 
profiles, and the return to education to vary across the native 
control group and each of the six ethnic groups. The age-earnings 
profiles of immigrants may differ from native profiles because the 
nature of work experience may be different across groups. For 
example, immigrant work experience in the country of origin may be 
less valuable than experience in the U.S., yielding less steep 
age-earnings profiles. The immigrant age-earnings profile may 
also reflect assimilation into the U.S. labor market - immigrants 
accumulate U.S. market-specific skills over time which the native-
born already possess. The return to education may vary across 
groups in the sample because of differences across countries of 
origin in educational quality or relevance to the U.S. market. 
Each country has its own intercept term, plus dummy variables 
for year of immigration 1970-74, 1965-69, 1960-64, and 1950-59. 
The dummy variable for immigrants who arrived 1975-79 is left out. 
If the immigrant intercept is equal to the native intercept, and 
the four cohort dummies are insignificant, then the model explains 
all the differences between the immigrant ethnic group and native 
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earnings; if the four dummies are insignificant, then the model 
explains the differences among the cohorts of a particular 
immigrant group.17 
Since the importance and function of enclaves may vary by 
immigrant group, the enclave variables are entered separately fbr 
only three countries of origin : Mexico (16. 3% of the immigrant 
sample), Cuba (17.4% of the immigrant sample), and China (5.95% of 
the immigrant sample). In addition, a dummy variable for China is 
entered separately to distinguish country of origin effects from 
enclave effects (the Mexican and Cuban dummies already enter as 
intercept terms). 
6.2 Human Capital Coefficients and Intercept Terms 
Look first at the self-employed earnings equation in table 6. 
The native human capital coefficients suggest an increasing and 
concave age-earnings profile 18 and a positive return to education. 
17A word of explanation about the statistical testing 
strategy will be helpful. In each of the three equations of Table 
6, it is desirable to test jointly the equality of the 
coefficients of the various immigrant age, education, and 
intercept variables with the corresponding native coefficients. 
In order to make these tests easier to compute, the same model is 
estimated with slight changes in the way the variables are 
entered. In the model displayed in table 6, the variables for 
native constant, age, and education contain zeros for the 
immigrant observations. In the 'test' model, those variables 
contain not zeros but the immigrant values for immigrant 
observations. The coefficients from the 'test' model are 
interpreted as the difference between the native coefficient and 
the immigrant coefficient. Equality of native and immigrant 
coefficients can be tested using t-tests, or, for groups of 
variables, Wald tests. Wald test statistics are reported for all 
of these restrictions. 
18The age variables are jointly insignificant (x 2 (2)=4.11). 
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Human capital coefficients and intercept terms for the six 
immigrant groups are displayed below the native coefficients. For 
each immigrant group, the hypothesis that the return to age and 
education, and the intercepts, are all equal to the native 
coefficients was tested. The resulting x2 (8) statistics 19 (White, 
3.82; Black, 3.88; Asian, 4.58; Cuban, 3.19; Mexico, 4.92; Other 
Hispanic, 3.34) indicate a failure to reject equality of 
coefficients. This implies that the age-earnings profiles and 
returns to education are equal across native and immigrant groups 
in self-employment. Also, there are no significant earnings 
differences within immigrant groups by year of immigration, nor 
are there any differences between immigrant and native self­
employment earnings. 
Turning to the wage sector earnings equation estimates, one 
notices significant differences between the immigrant and native 
coefficients. For three immigrant groups (White, Asian, and Other 
Hispanic) the age-earnings profile is not significantly different 
from the native-born profile (x 2 (2)=.49, 3.95, and 4.87, 
respectively2 0 ) • Mexican immigrants have significantly steeper 
profiles (x 2 (2)=9.24). Blacks and Cubans have relatively less 
steep profiles (x 2 (2)=11.77 and 9.66, respectively). In order to 
understand these differences, we must understand the employment 
and experience histories of the different ethnic groups. For 
The 5% critical value is 5.99. 
19The 5% critical value is 15.51. 
20 The critical value for a 5% test is 5.99. 
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example, if Asian immigrants acquire more general human capital, 
transferable across jobs, or if they have lower turnover rates, 
then they lose less human capital over time as they change 
occupations or industries. Until we know more on this subject, 
however, we can only speculate. 
Each immigrant group except the Asians has a significantly 
different rate of return to education in the wage sector ( t­
s tatis tic= 4.30 (White), 4.81 (Black), .81 (Asian), 3.93 (Cuban), 
5.63 (Mexican), 3.83 (Other Hispanic)). For every immigrant group 
except the Asians, the rate of return is lower than the native 
rate; this may reflect different education quality in the country 
of origin, or the inadequacy of foreign education as a U.S. job 
market signal. 
For White immigrants, there is no significant difference 
between the earnings of the different cohorts and the native-born 
(a Wald test of the equality of the ethnic and native intercepts, 
and the significance of the four cohort dummies, yields 
x2 (5)=4.04, critical value=ll.07). The model explains both the 
differences between the earnings of this group and the native-
born, as well as the differences among the cohorts. Both the 
Black and Asian wage estimates indicate a pattern of earnings 
across cohorts cohorts which arrived earlier have up to 30% 
higher earnings than the 1975-79 cohort. These patterns are 
similar to the cross-section patterns first documented by 
Chiswick[1978]. The Cuban wage sector equation estimates imply no 
differences between the earnings of the different cohorts and 
native earnings, but significantly higher earningsc--for all of the 
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Cubans. The Mexican and Other Hispanic estimates imply the same 
pattern of rising earnings with time in the U.S. that is evident 
in the Asian and Black estimates. 
The estimates of the human capital coefficients allow us to 
draw several conclusions about self-employment and wage earnings 
among immigrants and the native-born. In the self-employment 
sector, there are few significant differences in the age-earnings 
profiles, intercepts, or return to education between immigrants 
and the native-born In the wage sector, controlling for age, 
education and several other variables (discussed below) leaves the 
classic pattern of increasing earnings with time in the U.S. 
unchanged for four of the six immigrant groups. Finally, the 
return to education for five of six immigrant groups is lower than 
the native rate, reflecting the lower quality of foreign education 
or the inadequacy of foreign education as a signal. 
Turn now to the human capital coefficients for the index 
function in column three. As was the case for the self-employed 
estimates, none of the immigrant groups have age-earnings profiles 
which are significantly different from the native-born (x 2 (2)=.62, 
.13, 5.77, 3.27, .99, and .50, respectively). Three of six 
immigrant groups (Whites, Asians, and Cubans) have significantly 
lower coefficients on education than the native coefficient21 This 
is consistent with the hypothesis, supported by the estimated 
rates of return to education in the wage sector, that education in 
21The t-statistics for the differences are 5.00(White), 
l.40(Black), 4.lO(Asian), 3.50(Cuban), l.15(Mexican), and 
.72(0ther Hispanic). 
26 
the country of origin is less valuable in the U.S. than U.S. 
education. Borjas[l986] speculates that education gives an 
individual a comparative advantage in self-employment, by enabling 
him to perceive the opportunities, and decrease the uncertainty, 
in the self-employment sector. It is plausible that foreign 
education confers fewer of these advantages in the U.S. market 
than U.S. education. 
As was the case in the self-employed earnings equations, the 
index function explains all of the differences between immigrant 
and native self-employment propensities. Wald tests for the joint 
significance of the cohort dummies and the equality of the native 
and immigrant intercepts fails to reject (x 2 (4)= 1.90 (White), 
3.10 (Black), 8.99 (Asian), 4.34 (Cuban), 6.50 (Mexican), and 5.44 
(Other Hispanic). Critical value=ll.07) Only Mexican cohort 
1950-59 has significantly lower self-employment probabilities than 
native workers. 
6.3 Testing Hypotheses of Immigrant Self-employment 
Before evaluating the evidence for the various hypotheses of 
self-employment, the coefficients on the variable for Southern 
residence and language ability must be examined. The estimated 
coefficient on the variable SOUTH that is negative in the wage 
sector is not statistically significant in the self-employed 
sector. 22 Consistent with SOUTH 1 s effect in the sector earnings 
22This result contradicts the compensating differential 
theory of the Southern differential (that Southern life is 
pleasanter than life elsewhere, and therefore less well 
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equations, the probability of self-employment is 2.4% higher in 
the South. 
The estimated coefficients on language proficiency imply that 
the lack of ability to speak English has a large negative effect 
on wage sector earnings, but no significant effect on self-
employed earnings. Despite this differential effect, lack of 
English discourages self-employment. Non-English speakers are 2.7% 
less likely to enter self-employment than English-speakers. 
Entering self-employment may be more costly without fluent command 
of English, by making start-up capital less accessible. 
The three enclave variables (Mexican, Cuban, and Chinese) 
together confirm the hypothesis that the gains to self-employment 
are relatively larger in an enclave. Mexican and Chinese enclaves 
increase the probability of self-employment ( for Mexicans, an 
increase in the proportion of a city's population that is Mexican 
by 1% increases the probability of self-employment by . 78%; for 
Chinese, by 4.54%). The Cuban enclave variable is insignificant 
in the index function, but is significantly negative (t=2.9) in 
the wage sector equation. 
Immigrant enclaves, when they affect earnings, often depress 
them. The coefficients on the enclave variables in both sectoral 
earnings equations are all negative, although only the wage 
coefficients on %Mexico and %Cuba are statistically significant. 
compensated), because there is no similar differential in the 
self-employed sector. A theory that attributes lower Southern 
wages to the absence of unions in the South is consiste'nt with 
these estimates, since the self-employed, many of whom employ
relatively few people, should not be greatly affected by unions. 
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This phenomenon suggests that immigrants in enclaves compete with 
one another in the labor market or, if they are self-employed, in 
the product market. They are substitutes in production, and the 
products they offer as businessmen are substitutes in consumer 
demand. An increase in their supply leads to a fall in earnings. 
Presumably, immigrants are willing to tolerate lower earnings 
because of the benefits of life in the enclave - the presence of 
family, familiarity with the culture, et cetera. 
The home country self-employment hypothesis finds support as 
well. The variable HOMESELF has a significantly positive 
coefficient in the index function. Immigrants from a country with 
twice the self-employment rate of t~e U.S. will enter self­
employment at a 4 .4% higher rate than the native-born. This 
advantage in self-employment is reflected in neither of the sector 
earnings equations, where HOMESELF is statistically insignificant. 
The tax rate hypothesis finds scant support in these 
estimates. The average tax rate is insignificant in the index 
function, although it has the expected sign. It is negative but 
insignificant in both earnings equations. 
It should be noted that the HOMESELF may be excluded from the 
earnings equations to provide an overidentifying assumption for 
the model. A Likelihood Ratio test reject the exclusion 
(x 2 (2)=.60, critical value=S.99). Thus, if one is nervous about 
the reliance upon distributional assumptions to identify the 
model, the exclusion of HOMESELF from the earnings equations will 
serve. 
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Note, however, that the exclusion of H0MESELF from the 
earnings equations implies a slightly different theory concerning 
the effect of self-employment human capital on the self-employment 
decision. Previous experience in self-employment, which H0MESELF 
attempts to measure, does not affect the self-employment decision 
through the earnings in either sector; instead, previous self­
employment experience either lowers the start-up costs for self­
employment, or increases the desirability of self-employment ( or 
decreases the desirability of working for a boss). 
The variance and covariance terms are imprecisely estimated; 
the selection terms (the covariances) in each sector are 
insignificant. This suggests that the sector earnings equations 
may be estimated separately, without any selection correction. 23 
The Box-Cmt terms, reported in the row labelled LAMBDA, .i.m.l.i.ca te 
that in the self-employed sector the error term is not distributed 
lognormally. The significantly negative parameter suggests that 
wage sector earnings are more skewed than the lognormal 
distribution. The Box-Cox parameter in the wage sector is not 
significantly different from zero; one cannot reject the 
assumption of lognormal errors in this sector. 
The empirical model assumes that there are two distinct 
sectors; are the two sectors in fact different? The assumption 
can be tested by imposing the restrictions 61 = 62 and o1 = o2 The 
23 Do the coefficient estimates change significantly when 
selection is not taken into account? A specification test of the 
selection model of earnings in both sectors fails to reject joint
equality of coefficients across the selectivity corrected and 
uncorrected models (x2 ( 63 )=. 0042 for the self-employed earnings 
equation, x2 (63)=.0386 for the wage sector earnings equation). 
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difference between the log-likelihoods of the restricted and 
unrestricted models yields a Likelihood Ratio statistic 
( x2 ( 64 )=85. 34) exceeding the critical value (83. 46). The test 
marginally rejects the hypothesis that the two sectors are 
identical. 
6.4 Summary of Results 
The switching regression estimates from the six ethnic groups 
have implications for the three hypotheses laid out in section 2. 
Average tax rates are insignificant predictors of self-employment, 
providing weak evidence for the tax rate hypothesis, unlike the 
results of Blau[1987] and Long[1982). These support the home 
country self-employment hypothesis; self-employment probabilities 
and home country self-employment rates are positively correlated. 
The enclave hypothesis was supported by the Mexican and Chinese 
estimates; Cuban enclaves, however, have no significant impact on 
self-employment probabilities. 2 4 In addition, enclaves depress 
immigrant earnings in the wage sector. 
In general, these estimates suggest that there are no 
significant differences between the age-earnings profiles of 
immigrants and the native-born in either sector. The returns to 
education differed, however, in the wage sector. Immigrant 
24Several alternative specifications of the enclave 
hypothesis are plausible. An interaction with a community wealth 
variable may capture an enclave's demand for services usually 
provided by the One might also interact the enclave variables with 
a dummy variable for ability to speak English, suggesting that the 
enclaves will be more important for immigrants who do not speak 
English. 
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education was associated with lower earnings than native 
education, reflecting perhaps education quality differences, or 
the inadequacy of foreign education as a job market signal in the 
U.S. Also notable are the number of immigrant intercept terms 
that are insignificantly different from the native intercept, and 
the number of insignificant cohort dummies. The model explains 
most of the differences between native and immigrant earnings in 
both sectors, and self-employment probabilities. 
There is no evidence of selection into either sector in these 
estimates. The differences between the two sectors I earnings 
equations, however, are significant they cannot be treated 
identically. This result helps us to interpret the replication of 
Borjas's work in section 2. If there is no selection into self or 
wage employment, Borjas's wage sector earnings equation estimates 
are not biased by the exclusion of the self-employed from his 
sample. In order to make some judgement about immigrant 
assimilation rates, however, one must still examine immigrant 
performance in the self-employed sector, because the self­
employment earnings equation is different from the wage-employed 
earnings equation. Changes in immigrant relative earnings in 
self-employment over the decade of the seventies must be combined 
with changes in wage sector relative earnings to calculate an 
immigrant assimilation rate. This has been done in section seven. 
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7 Recalculating Immigrant Assimilation Rates 
Recall the replication of Borjas 1 s methodology in section two 
(table 3). In that section, two sets of assimilation rates were 
calculated for White and Asian cohorts, using Borjas 1 s 
methodology. In the first set, the sample contained only wage 
sector workers. In the second set, self-employed sector workers 
were added to the sample, and were not distinguished from wage 
sector workers in the earnings regressions from which assimilation 
rates were calculated. 
The assimilation rate estimates of table 7 take into account 
the result, from the switching regression estimates of the last 
section, that earnings equations for the two types of workers are 
significantly different from one another. Columns one and two 
contain assimilation rate estimates using the Borjas methodology, 
calculated for the wage and self-employment sectors separately. 
The estimates in column one are thus the same as those in column 
one of table 3 both calc~late assimilation rates for wage sector 
workers only. The estimates of immigrant self-employment relative 
earnings growth, in column two, show a higher rate of immigrant 
assimilation in the self-employed sector than in the wage sector 
for each cohort except Asian 1950-59. These estimates demonstrate 
that, by excluding workers in this sector, one ignores an 
important part of any immigrant cohort, the sector in which 
immigrants fare best relative to the native-born. 
Column three combines the estimates in the first two columns, 
incorporating the insights from the switching regressions 
estimates. Predicted earnings for each cohort, in 1970 and 1980, 
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are calculated as a weighted average of predicted earnings in the 
two sectors. The weights are the self- and wage-employment rates 
for the cohort. The growth in this measure of predicted earnings, 
relative to native earnings, is the assimilation rate of column 3. 
It should be noted that this measure implicitly assumes that there 
is no selection into either sector in 1970 as well as in 1980. 
There is no evidence on this question; consequently, these 
estimates are only meant to demonstrate an alternative method of 
calculating immigrant relative earnings growth. 
The estimates in column 3, incorporating both sectors into 
predicted immigrant earnings, yields conclusions similar to those 
of the Borjas replication of section two. The White assimilation 
rate estimates are 11-21% higher when the self-employed sector is 
taken into account. Again, the estimates are more striking for 
the Asians. Although the estimate for the 1950-59 cohort 
decreases when the self-employed are accounted for, the other 
cohort estimates increase substantially. The 1965-69 estimate 
increases by 39%, and the 1960-64 estimate grows by 36%, becoming 
statistically significant. 
8 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been twofold. The first task 
was to demonstrate that self-employment among recent U.S. 
immigrants is an important empirical phenomenon. Simple 
comparisons of native-born and immigrant self-employment rates in 
1970 and 1980 establish that immigrants enter into self-employment 
at a higher rate, and that the difference in self-employment rates 
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increased over the seventies. In addition, a simple empirical 
example demonstrated how estimates of immigrant assimilation rates 
may be sensitive to sample selection rules which exclude the self­
employed. 
After establishing the importance of the self-employed, the 
second task was to model self-employment choice, in an attempt to 
understand why immigrants choose that sector more often than 
natives. In the context of a switching regressions model of 
earnings in two sectors, three hypotheses were tested (the tax 
rate, immigrant enclave, home country, and anonymity hypotheses) 
on data for six immigrant ethnic groups. There is strong evidence 
for the home country and enclave hypotheses, and little evidence 
for the tax rate or anonymity hypotheses. 
In addition to confirming and rejecting various hypotheses of 
self-employment choice, the estimates of the switching regressions 
model provided evidence that the self-employed earnings equation 
differs significantly from the wage sector earnings equation. New 
estimates of assimilation rates were calculated, taking this new 
information into account. Again, assimilation rates are higher 
when the experience of immigrants in the self-employed sector is 
taken into account in assimilation rate estimates. 
Previous estimates of immigrant earnings growth ignore self-
employed workers and their earnings. Consequently, a large, 
growing, and particularly successful component of any immigrant 
group has been ignored. Immigrant economic performance is higher 
when those immigrants who seek to better their economic condition 
in the self-employed sector are incorporated into the analysis. 
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1970 Self-employment Rates by Ethnic Groups(standard errors) 
I Estimated Self-employment Rates, 1970 I 
1--------------------------------------------·------I 
I Immigrants, By Year of Immigration I Native- I
1------------------------------------1 born, same I 
I 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 I ethnic group!----- - - --- ---1- ------ ____,____,_,____,______________,_______,_,__ - --- - --1 
White 
I 
I 4.15 9.92 12.11 5.99 
I 
I 
I ( .23) ( .41) ( .28) ( .07) I 
Mexican 
I 
I 1.93 2.90 4.73 5.16 
I 
I 
I ( .34) ( .45) ( .46) ( .44) I 
Asian 
I 
I 3.29 6.39 12.87 5.47 
I 
I 
I ( .41) ( .89) (1.13) ( .88) I 
Cuban 
I 
I 4.85 9.00 11.95 5.99 
I 
I 
I ( .59) ( .71) (1.29) ( .o7) I 
Black 
I 
I 3.00 4.10 4.44 2.24 
I 
I 
I ( .58) (1.01) (1.14) ( .13) I 
I I 
Other I 2.41 5.76 10.19 4.85 I 
Hispanic I ( .40) ( . 7 5) (1.19) ( . 61) I 
I I 
source: for immigrants, based on a 3% Census tabulation of the 1970 
Census, Native born rates are based on .14% tabulations of 
the 1970 Census. Sample includes all males ages 18-54 in 
1970, regardless of labor force status. 
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TABLE 2 
1980 Self-employment Rates by Ethnic Groups(standard errors) 
I Estimated Self-employment Rates, 1980 I
l---------------------------------------------------1 
I Immigrants, By Year of Immigration I Native- I
1------------------------------------1 born, same I 
I 1965-69 1960-64 1950-59 I ethnic group!
-------------1---------------------------------------------------I 
I I 
White I 16.61* 17.68* 17.17* 9.42* 
I ( .32) ( .34) ( .21) ( .07) 
I 
Mexican I 5.36* 6.92* 8.05* 5.14 
I ( . 29) ( . 37) ( . 34) ( .33) 
I 
Asian I 14.66* 17.24* 16.19* 9.98* 
I ( . 55) ( . 88) ( . 76) ( .99) 
I 
Cuban I 14.25* 17.64* 17.93* 9.42* 
I ( . 62) ( . 60) ( . 95) ( . 07) 
I 
Black I 5. 74* 6.94 7.55 2.75* 
I ( .46) ( .81) ( . 86) ( .12) 
I 
Other I 10.23* 12.43* 12.74 5.60 
Hispanic I ( . 51) ( . 67) ( .84) ( .61) 
I 
* - difference between 1980 and 1970 rates is statistically 
significant at a 5% significance level. 
source: for immigrants, based on a 7% Census tabulation of the 1980 
Census, Native born rates are based on .23% tabulations of 
the 1980 Census. Sample includes all males ages 28-64 in 
1980, regardless of labor force status. 
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Restrictions on the Data, Immigrant and Native samples 
Restriction # immigrants remaining 
ages 25-64, 
samples of 1980 
census 
A and B 
170,466 
delete earnings <0, hours <35, 131,675 
weeks worked <30 
resides in 150 114,892 
largest SMSAs 
enclave data available 102 I 926 
for country of origin 
delete those in 98,902 
agricultural industries 
%HOMESELF unavailable 90,830 
Excluding wage<l.84 88,365 
or >100 
working subsample 6099 









Descriptive Statistics, Native and Immigrant Samples 
I Native Sample White Imm. Sample Black Imm. Sample
1------------------------------------------------------
variable I mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev. 
Log Earnings 9.91 .575 10.06 * .564 9.66 * .506 
Self Emp. Rate .080 .272 .146* .354 .049* .216 
Age 41.12 11.25 42.00* 10.24 39.75* 10.00 
Education 13.26 2.96 12.46* 4.23 11. 83* 3.58 
South .275 .447 .131* .337 .172* .378 
Language .004 .064 .095* .293 .063* .244 
D70-74 .098 .297 .300 .459 
D65-69 .202 .402 .325 .469 
D60-64 .156 .363 .098 .298 
D50-59 .430 .495 .085 .279 
%country .565 .579 .576 .412 
Home GNP 1978/1000 - 5.22 2.87 1.30 1.27 
Miles to home/1000 - 3. 71 1.48 .89 .751 
Home self emp. 1 1.27* .695 1.73* .337 
Avg tax $25000 26.28 2.78 27.05* 2.84 27.97* 3.05 
N 4142 1011 1119 
* - difference between native and immigrant means are 
statistically significant at a 5% significance level. 
** - difference between native and immigrant means are 
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. 
TABLE 5 (continued) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
42 
!Asian Imm Sample Cuban Imm. Sample Mex. Imm. Sample
1------------------------------------------------------
variable I mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev. 
Log Earnings 9.92 .630 9.83* .569 9.60* .505 
Self Emp. Rate .129* .335 .144* .351 .044** .205 
Age 39.31* 9.25 45.55* 10 .17 36.29* 9.28 
Education 14.54* 4.08 11. 72* 4.23 7.90* 4.33 
South .101* .301 .616* .487 .196* .397 
Language .163* .369 .339* .473 .476* .500 
D70-74 .276 .447 .142 .349 .290 .454 
D65-69 .233 .423 .294 .456 .196 .397 
D60-64 .091 .288 .388 .487 .153 .361 
D50-59 .118 .323 .149 .356 .180 .384 
%country .841 1.07 10.80 9.43 6.42 4.30 
Home GNP 1978/1000 1.50 2.21 .810 0.00 1.29 0.00 
Miles to home/1000 7.85 1.67 .235 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Home self emp. 2.17* .850 1.88* .000 2.42* .000 
Avg .tax $25000 28.02* 2.68 24.23* 2.96 27.42* 3.08 
N 964 1063 997 
* - difference between native and immigrant means are 
statistically significant at a 5% significance level. 
** - difference between native and immigrant means are 
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. 
TABLE 5 (continued) 
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I Other Hisp Sample
1------------------
variable 1 mean std.dev. 
Log Earnings 9. 72* .573 
Self Emp. Rate .071* .257 
Age 38.61* 9.18 
Education 11.79* 3.91 
South .161* .368 
Language .289* .453 
D70-74 .260 .439 
D65-69 .281 .450 
D60-64 .179 .383 
D50-59 .088 .283 
%country .282 .273 
Home self emp. 2.41* .508 
Avg tax $25000 27. 76* 2.95 
N 945 
* - difference between native and immigrant means are 





Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Pooled Sample 
coefficients (t-stats in parentheses) 
Self-employed wage-employed index 
I earnings equation earnings equation function 
1--------------------------------------------------------
I coef. tstat coef. tstat coef. tstat
----------1--------------------------------------------------------
NATIVE : I 
constant I 4.669 (5.34) 7.917 (18.8) -4.901 (8.86) 
age I .0621 (1. 98) .0698 (5.90) .0891 (3.81) 
agesq/100 I -.0654 (2.00) -.0708 (5.63) -.0843 (3.16) 
education I .0424 (2.09) .0690 (6.83) .0617 (6.32) 
I 
WHITE IMM: I 
constant I 5.632 (5.57) 8.016 (15.5) -4.149 (4.26) 
age I .0298 (1.05) .0809 (4.23) .0928 (2.10) 
agesq/100 I -.0318 (1.04) -.0832 (3.90) -.0939 (1. 87) 
education I .0196 (2.05) .0402 (5.59) -.0171 (1. 38) 
d70-74 I .182 (1. 37) -.0001 (.002) -.0987 ( .43) 
d65-69 I .129 (1. 21) .113 (1. 66) .0462 ( .24) 
d60-64 I .0751 ( .70) .0722 (1.02) -.0878 ( .42) 
d50-59 I .124 (1. 20) .0575 ( .92) .0564 ( .31) 
I 
BLACK IMM: I 
constant I 5.200 (4.06) 8.483 (15.3) -5.231 (4.19) 
age I .0479 (1.01) .0516 (3.43) .0945 (1. 64) 
agesq/100 I -.0610 (1.15) -.0579 (3.31) -.0935 (1. 42) 
education .0250 (1. 74) .0320 (4.98) .0326 (1.78) 
d70-74 .0215 ( .16) .138 (2.76) .0792 ( .38) 
d65-69 .267 (1.60) .256 (4.25) .0247 ( .11) 
d60-64 .210 (1.18) .334 (4.16) .139 ( .52) 
d50-59 .223 (1.12) .299 (3.51) .408 (1.46) 
ASIAN IMM: 
constant 4.883 (3.43) 7.557 (15.7) -7.857 (6.36) 
age .0667 (1.21) .0812 (4.12) .219 (3.84) 
agesq/100 -.0740 (1.23) -.0892 (3.92) -.223 (3.41) 
education .0219 (2.14) .0641 (6.27) -.0073 ( .53) 
d70-74 .0349 ( .39) .177 (3.32) .207 (1. 32) 
d65-69 .176 (1. 53) .216 (3.60) .289 (1.80) 
d60-64 .0350 ( .34) .260 (3.26) .197 ( .95) 








coefficients (t-stats in parentheses) 
Self-employed wage-employed index 
earnings equation earnings equation function 
coef. tstat coef. tstat coef. tstat 
CUBAN IMM: 
constant 5.327 (4.80) 8.739 (14.4) -5.490 (5.20) 
age .0356 ( .96) .0551 (3.46) .168 (3.78) 
agesq/100 -.0380 ( .96) -.0615 (3.46) - .177 (3.62) 
education .0297 (2.32) .0436 (5.76) .0063 ( .50) 
d70-74 .110 ( .80) -.106 ( .91) -.204 ( .70) 
d65-69 .154 (1. 06) -.0201 ( .18) -.415 (1.47) 
d60-64 .121 ( .91) .0836 ( .75) -.276 (1.00) 
d50-59 .0762 ( .51) .0303 ( .25) -.213 ( .68) 
MEX. IMM: 
constant 3.835 (2.86) 8.440 (15.0) -6.574 (4.58) 
age .134 (1. 86) .0753 (4.18) .161 (2.31) 
agesq/100 -.168 (1. 92) -.0864 (4.01) -.167 (2.00) 
education .0221 (1. 55) .0209 (4.10) .0387 (2.21) 
d70-74 .0718 ( .42) .123 (2.30) - .487 (2.04) 
d65-69 -.0933 ( .63) .198 (3.20) -.228 ( .97) 
d60-64 I -.0320 ( .18) .270 (3.79) -.487 (1.80) 
d50-59 I .0460 ( .28) .332 (3.87) -.142 ( .50) 
I 
OTHER I 
HISP. IMM: I 
constant I 5.220 (4.54) 8.483 (14.6) -4.930 (3. 71) 
age I .0399 ( .97) .0471 (2.70) .0699 (1.10) 
agesq/100 I -.0360 ( .79) -.0492 (2.41) -.0685 ( .92) 
education I .0357 (1. 86) .0434 (5.60) .0467 (2.53) 
d70-74 I -.240 (1.44) .111 (2.05) -.151 ( .65) 
d65-69 I -.0454 ( .37) .287 (4.27) .0999 ( .45) 
d60-64 I -.0688 ( .51) .360 (4.48) .317 (1. 36) 




coefficients (t-stats in parentheses) 
Self-employed wage-employed index 
I earnings equation earnings equation function 
1--------------------------------------------------------
I coef. ts tat coef. ts tat coef. ts tat 
----------1--------------------------------------------------------
South I -.0149 ( .44) -.0496 (2.90) .137 (2.58) 
language I -.0882 (1.56) -.156 (5.31) -.155 (2.13) 
I 
%Mexico I -.0140 (1. 23) -.0253 (4.75) .0443 (2.79) 
%Cuba I -.0013 ( .47) -.0061 (2.90) .0003 ( .05) 
China I .0606 ( .67) .0148 ( .27) .141 ( . 84) 
%China I - . 0111 ( . 20) -.0263 ( . 59) .258 (2.45) 
homeself I .0306 ( .68) -.0107 ( . 66) .251 (5.22) 
GNP78/1000I .0184 (1.32) .0324 (4.67) .0561 (3.55) 
miles/1000I -.0090 ( . 57) -.0012 ( .14) .0734 (2.85) 
avgtax$25 I -.0062 (1.30) -.0036 (1. 53) .0081 (1.05) 
I 
variance I .0820 (1.17) .268 (3.64) 
cov I -.0808 ( .45) .0311 ( . 61) 
I 




Immigrant Assimilation Rates, by Sector, and Combined Total 
I Estimates of Earnings Growth, Relative to Native 
I Controls of Same Ethnic Group, 1970-80 (t-statistics)
l--------------------------------------------------------
1 (Borjas) 
Group and Year! Wage-employed Self-employed Weighted Average 
of Immigration! Sample Only Sample Only of Two Sectors 
White 
1965-69 .1620 .4204 .1867 
(12.8) (6.48) (14.9) 
1960-64 .0751 .1925 .0831 
(6.45) (3.62) (6.20) 
1950-59 .0526 .2398 .0636 
(4.46) (5.11) (5.39) 
Asian 
1965-69 .2371 .7025 .3052 
(3.44) (2.13) (4.49) 
1960-64 .1466 .3798 .1997 
(1.90) (1.18) (2.65) 
1950-59 .0603 -.0731 .0378 
( .79) ( .19) ( .49) 
